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HOUR LATE ON YOUR BAIL, SPEND THE 
WEEKEND IN JAIL: SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
Abstract: On March 9, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held, in Dawson v. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, 
that the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt is 
not a fundamental right. Rather, the court held, it is a non-fundamental liberty 
interest. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit split with the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, which had held that the right is fundamental. The 
Tenth Circuit also diverged from the Ninth Circuit in its application of a test to 
determine whether the government’s detention policy constituted unconstitu-
tional punishment. On January 7, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Dawson, declining to address the circuit split. This Comment argues that the 
most accurate reading of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leads to the conclu-
sion that the Court has recognized the right to be free from detention absent a 
determination of guilt as fundamental. This Comment further argues that the 
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Dawson to clarify the Tenth 
Circuit’s application of the law in two key areas. Such clarification is necessary 
to reduce confusion among the circuits in future pretrial detention cases. Lastly, 
it argues that the Supreme Court should have taken this opportunity to add addi-
tional factors to the test to help courts determine whether a government’s deten-
tion policy is excessive in relation to the government’s interest. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of Thursday, May 29, 2014, Kenneth Jerome Dawson 
was arrested for violating a restraining order and placed in custody at the Jef-
ferson County Sheriff’s Office.1 Though he posted bond the next day and ful-
filled his obligations of release, county policies required that he be detained 
through the weekend until 4 p.m. on Monday of the following week.2 Dawson 
sued, arguing that Jefferson County had—without justification—infringed up-
on his fundamental right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determina-
tion of guilt.3 In Dawson v. Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson 
County (“Dawson II”), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determina-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty. (Dawson II), 732 F. App’x 624, 625 (10th 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 (2019). 
 2 Id. at 626. 
 3 Id. at 625; see also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 14–18, Dawson II, 732 F. App’x 624 (No. 16-
cv-01281). 
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tion of guilt is not a fundamental right, but rather a non-fundamental liberty 
interest.4 In so holding, the Tenth Circuit split with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had held that the right is fundamental.5 
Dawson filed a petition for writ of certiorari in his case to the United States 
Supreme Court.6 At stake was the constitutionality of many federal, state, 
county, and municipal policies concerning pretrial detention, and a chance for 
the Supreme Court to clarify the circumstances under which pretrial detention 
violates an individual’s substantive due process rights.7 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “[n]o state 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
the law.”8 Courts have interpreted the Due Process Clause to mean, in part, 
that states cannot deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without 
providing fair procedures.9 This component of the Due Process Clause is re-
ferred to as “procedural due process.”10 In addition to the procedural compo-
nent, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a “substantive” compo-
nent to the Due Process Clause, which protects individual liberties against 
certain government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement 
those actions.11 That component of the Due Process Clause is referred to as 
“substantive due process.”12 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 632. 
 5 See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that it is a fun-
damental right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt). 
 6 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson 
Cty. (Dawson III), 139 S. Ct. 862 (2019) (No. 18-177) (arguing that the Court should grant certio-
rari). 
 7 Id. at 23; see also Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 638 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (noting 
that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dawson II will save federal courts from supervising pretrial 
detention policies in jails and prisons around the country and implying that applying the strict 
scrutiny standard to some of these policies might call their constitutionality into doubt). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (observing that procedural due process com-
ponent of Due Process Clause protects against a government’s deprivation of an individual’s life, 
liberty or property without proper procedures); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 
(holding that the fundamental requirement of due process is an individual’s opportunity to be 
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before a government policy goes into 
effect). 
 10 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501–02 
(1999) (explaining that procedural due process is an inquiry into whether the government followed 
proper procedures before depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property). 
 11 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(stating that the notion that the Due Process Clause has a substantive component is no longer up 
for debate); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 331 (1986). 
 12 See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 1501–02 (defining substantive due process as an in-
quiry into whether the government’s infringement upon or deprivation of an individual’s life, 
liberty, or property is justified by a sufficient purpose). 
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The Supreme Court has described two ways in which a government’s 
action might violate an individual’s substantive due process rights: either 
through a government action that infringes on a right without sufficient jus-
tification, or by depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such an 
arbitrary way that it shocks the conscience.13 The Court’s jurisprudence in 
the substantive due process arena has created two different tests for lower 
courts to use in determining whether a government action or policy uncon-
stitutionally burdens an individual’s substantive due process rights: the so-
called “rights” and “shocks-the-conscience” tests.14 The Supreme Court has 
never clearly articulated when courts should apply one test over the other, 
but most courts apply the rights test to legislation and the shocks-the-
conscience test to specific conduct by a government official or entity.15 This 
Comment’s analysis is limited to a discussion of the rights test.16 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (first citing Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937); and then citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1965)) 
(referencing Palko as support for the first proposition and Rochin as support for the second propo-
sition). 
 14 Dawson II, 723 F. App’x at 634; see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (stating that the criteria to 
determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred differ depending on whether 
the government action involves legislation or a specific act of a government official). Under the 
“rights” test, if a government action burdens a fundamental right, the action must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Dias 
v. City & County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, if the gov-
ernment action burdens a non-fundamental right, the government is merely required to show the 
infringement bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate government interest. Flores, 507 U.S. at 
302; Dias, 567 F.3d at 1181. Under the “shocks-the-conscience” test, government action violates 
substantive due process if it is so arbitrary that it “shocks the conscience” and “violates the decen-
cy of civilized conduct.” Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
 15 See Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 634 (stating that the Supreme Court has wavered on which 
test to apply); see also Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 
1672, 1788 (2012) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846) (explaining that Lewis holds that the shocks-
the-conscience test is applicable in executive action claims). Compare Hancock v. County of 
Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining the court applies the rights test to legis-
lation and the shocks-the-conscience test to executive action), and Handy-Clay v. City of Mem-
phis, 695 F.3d 531, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining the two substantive due process tests and not-
ing that for executive action to violate substantive due process, it must “shock the conscience”), 
with Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1181–82 (8th Cir. 2003) (pointing out confusion in the 
law and explaining that a plaintiff challenging executive action must satisfy both the rights test 
and the shocks-the-conscience test to prevail), and Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the shocks-the-conscience test is a threshold inquiry prior to applying the 
rights test for executive action, but only the rights test applies to legislative action), and Waldman 
v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (implying shocks-the-conscience test should be 
applied to executive action and rights test to legislative action, but not explicitly holding so). Since 
Dawson II, the Tenth Circuit appears to now follow a binary approach, as discussed in Chief Jus-
tice Timothy Tymkovich’s concurrence, applying the rights test when the government action con-
cerns a legislative act and the shocks-the-conscience test if the government action concerns execu-
tive action. Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 636 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring). 
 16 See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. The court in Dawson II found that the 
“shocks the conscience” test was inapplicable, but the majority did not explain how it arrived at its 
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If a court chooses to apply the rights test to a substantive due process 
challenge, the next step in the inquiry is to determine whether a fundamen-
tal right is at issue.17 That determination itself requires the two-step analysis 
laid out by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.18 First, the re-
viewing court must carefully describe the asserted right at stake.19 Second, 
the court must determine whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist” without the right.20 If the right at 
issue is a fundamental right, a government action or policy may burden the 
right only if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.21 
On the other hand, if the right at issue is non-fundamental, a government 
                                                                                                                           
conclusion. 732 F. App’x at 629; see id. at 636–37 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (citing Dias, 567 
F.3d at 1182) (“Since the Board of County Commissioners adopted the challenged policy by reso-
lution, the policy is legislative. We therefore apply the ‘rights’ approach under Dias.”). 
 17 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 
F.3d 762, 769 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 18 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; see Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 769 (finding the inquiry into 
whether a fundamental right is at issue is a two-step process that requires: (1) carefully describing 
the right at issue and (2) determining whether the right is deeply rooted in the nation’s history). 
The Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to expand the doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (first citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125; and then citing Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (explaining that the Court must exercise care 
in finding new fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court”); see also Peter Nicolas, 
Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 331, 336 (2016) (stat-
ing that conservative justices in particular have historically been hesitant to identify and enforce 
fundamental rights not explicitly granted by the Constitution). 
 19 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The phrase “careful description” was intended to strike a 
balance between generality and specificity in framing the right at issue. Nicolas, supra note 18, at 
338. As D.C. Circuit Judge Judith Rogers put it, when framing the right at issue, courts must em-
ploy enough specificity to base the right in its practical application, but enough generality to con-
nect the right to its defining principles. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 554 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 20 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Dias, 567 F.3d 
at 1181. The first step of the two-step process—how narrowly or broadly the right is framed by a 
court—will typically determine the conclusion. Nicolas, supra note 18, at 338. If the right at issue 
is framed in specific terms, one is less likely to find that it is “deeply rooted in our nation’s histo-
ry.” Id. On the other hand, if it is framed in fairly general terms, one is more likely to find histori-
cal support for the right. Id. 
 21 Flores, 507 U.S. at 302. This standard is commonly referred to as “strict scrutiny.” Roy G. 
Spece, Jr., Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 295 (2015). Strict scrutiny can be 
traced to Lochner v. New York and the resulting line of cases. Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905)). Strict scrutiny emerged out of the principles that important rights deserve 
special protection, these rights are best protected by requiring sufficiently compelling government 
interests, and unneeded deprivation of individual rights is best avoided by requiring close attention 
to policy or law’s over-broadness. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 
(1938) (indicating that a higher level of scrutiny should apply to legislation that implicates im-
portant rights, such as those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights); see also 
Richard Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–75 (2006) (tracing the 
emergence of strict scrutiny in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
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action or policy may burden the right as long as it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.22 
Part I of this Comment discusses the holdings of two seminal Supreme 
Court cases concerning the issue of pretrial detention, and provides the fac-
tual and procedural history of Dawson II.23 Part II discusses the differing 
approaches the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have taken to analyzing substan-
tive due process claims within the context of pretrial detention.24 Part III 
argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has recognized that the right 
to be free from detention absent a determination of guilt is a fundamental 
right, and that the Court should have granted certiorari to clarify the Daw-
son II court’s application of the law and to modify the Bell test’s third 
part.25 
I. THE SUPREME COURT ON PRETRIAL DETENTION AND DAWSON II’S 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Section A of this Part discusses the holdings of two seminal Supreme 
Court cases concerning the issue of pretrial detention—Bell v. Wolfish and 
United States v. Salerno—and analyzes how the Court applied the funda-
mental rights framework in those cases.26 Section B discusses the factual 
background and procedural history of Dawson II.27 
A. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Substantive Due Process  
in the Context of Pretrial Detention 
Two Supreme Court cases help guide the fundamental rights inquiry in 
the context of pretrial detainment.28 The first, Bell v. Wolfish, involved 
plaintiffs who were pretrial detainees who claimed that certain conditions of 
their confinement violated their substantive due process rights.29 In an opin-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Flores, 507 U.S. at 305; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771. This standard is commonly referred to 
as “rational basis review.” See Rational-Basis Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (describing rational basis review as a standard under which laws will be upheld as long as 
they bear some rational relation to a legitimate government interest). 
 23 See infra notes 26–65 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 66–89 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 90–120 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 28–46 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 47–65 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 (finding that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not violate 
pretrial detainees’ substantive due process rights); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541–61 (1979) 
(holding that certain conditions of confinement of the Metropolitan Correctional Center did not 
amount to unconstitutional punishment before a determination of guilt and thus did not violate 
pretrial detainees’ substantive due process rights); Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 632 (stating that its 
analysis is guided by Bell and Salerno). 
 29 Bell, 441 U.S. at 523. The challenged conditions included jail employees’ practice of as-
signing two inmates to cells built for one inmate and conducting visual body-cavity searches of 
II.-242 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
ion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reasoned that while it is 
unconstitutional to punish a pretrial detainee before a determination of guilt, 
regulation of prison conditions and procedures is permissible so long as it 
does not constitute punishment.30 Absent a showing of an express intent to 
punish on the part of the officials who created the challenged condition, the 
determination of whether the condition amounted to punishment turned on 
whether the condition was reasonably related to a legitimate government 
interest.31 
The Bell test for discerning unconstitutional punishment thus has three 
parts: (1) whether the detention condition was imposed for a punitive pur-
pose; (2) if not, whether there is a legitimate government interest justifying 
the condition; and (3) if there a legitimate interest, whether the condition 
appears excessive in relation to the government interest.32 If the condition 
was imposed for a punitive purpose or is excessive in relation to the gov-
ernment interest, it amounts to unconstitutional punishment.33 The Court 
also stated that the government’s legitimate interests in pretrial detention 
were not limited to assuring a detainee’s presence at trial or safety of the 
community, but also included the government’s need to manage a prison 
facility’s “operational concerns.”34 
                                                                                                                           
inmates following a contact visit. See id. at 527. The first time the Supreme Court ruled on the 
rights of pretrial detainees was in Bell. Teresa Scarberry, The Constitutional Right of Pretrial 
Detainees: A Healthy Sense of Realism?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1087 (1980). Viewing penal 
administration as a responsibility of the executive branch, U.S. courts have been hesitant to take 
up cases concerning this body of law. Id. at 1088. 
 30 Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–37. The Court determined that the prison’s conditions of confine-
ment—including “double-bunking” and visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees—did not 
impermissibly amount to punishment because they were rationally related to legitimate govern-
ment interests and, consequently, did not violate the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. Id. 
at 561; see also Sonja Marret, Note, Beyond Rehabilitation: Constitutional Violations Associated 
with the Isolation and Discrimination of Transgender Youth in the Criminal Justice System, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 351, 356–57 (2016) (explaining that the Bell Court held that substantive due process 
protects pretrial detainees from conditions that amount to punishment). 
 31 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. If the condition is reasonably related to a legitimate government 
interest, it does not amount to punishment and does not offend a pretrial detainee’s substantive due 
process rights. Id. at 539. If the condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate government 
interest, a court may properly infer that the purpose of the condition is unconstitutional punish-
ment. Id. 
 32 Id. at 538; see Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 778–79 (discussing the Bell test and the ap-
plication of each prong); Scott D. Himsell, Comment, Preventive Detention: A Constitutional but 
Ineffective Means of Fighting Pretrial Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 442–43 (1986) 
(presenting the three-part legislative purpose test established by the Bell Court). 
 33 See Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 779 (explaining that a policy or law can amount to con-
stitutionally impermissible punishment on a pretrial detainee if either it was imposed with punitive 
intent or if it was excessive in relation to the government interest). 
 34 Bell, 441 U.S. at 541. The Court acknowledged the day-to-day management of prisons can 
be complicated and prison administrators should be afforded deference to adopt policies in ac-
cordance with their professional judgment. Id. at 547. In dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that 
2019] Substantive Due Process and Pretrial Detention II.-243 
Eight years later, in United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the right to be free from pretrial detention based on a substantive 
due process challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”).35 The re-
spondents challenged a provision of the BRA that required pretrial detention 
of arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the government demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence during an adversarial hearing that 
no release conditions would assure the safety of the community.36 
The Court began by applying Bell’s three-part test to determine wheth-
er the restriction on liberty authorized by the BRA constituted impermissi-
ble punishment.37 First, the Court looked to the legislative intent of Con-
gress and concluded that Congress did not formulate the BRA’s pretrial de-
tention provisions as punishment for dangerous arrestees.38 Second, the 
Court found that the government’s interest in preventing the release on bail 
of arrestees proven to be a danger to the community was both legitimate 
and compelling.39 Third, the Court found that the BRA was not excessive in 
relation to the government interest justifying the pretrial detainment.40 
Having established that the BRA was regulatory in nature and did not 
constitute impermissible punishment, the Court continued its analysis by 
                                                                                                                           
this broad definition of a legitimate government interest would allow a prison to impose virtually 
any condition on a pretrial detainee without it amounting to unconstitutional punishment. Id. at 
585 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissent, also criticizing the majori-
ty’s inclusion of effective management of the detention facility as a legitimate government inter-
est. Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained that the problem of such a 
broad definition of a legitimate government interest would be compounded by the Court’s failure 
to engage in an analysis of whether the conditions of confinement were, in fact, excessive in rela-
tion to the purported legitimate government interest. Id. In his view, by deferring to the judgments 
of the prison administrators without conducting an analysis into the rationality of the government 
interest or excessiveness of the government policy in relation to that interest, the Court in effect 
abdicated its duty to decide whether the pretrial detainees were subject to unconstitutional pun-
ishment. Id. at 567–68. 
 35 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. 
 36 Id. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”) as consti-
tutional and reversed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision. Id. 
 37 Id. at 747. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 747–49. 
 40 Id. at 747. The Court reasoned that the BRA was not excessive in relation to the govern-
ment’s compelling interest for three primary reasons. Id. at 750. First, the BRA operated only on 
individuals who had been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses. Id. Sec-
ond, Congress had found that these types of individuals are far more likely to present a danger to 
the community if released. Id. Third, the BRA required the government to convince a neutral deci-
sion-maker in an adversarial hearing by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of an 
arrestee’s release could reasonably assure the safety of the community. Id. Justice Marshall 
strongly dissented, believing the majority improperly accepted—without sufficient inquiry and 
analysis—that the BRA was regulatory rather than punitive in nature. See id. at 759 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
II.-244 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
evaluating the BRA under the rights test.41 First, the Court identified the 
type of right at issue as an individual’s fundamental “interest in liberty,” but 
it was unclear whether the Court was extending that broadly-framed recog-
nition to the more specifically-framed right to be free from pretrial deten-
tion absent a determination of guilt.42 Next, the Court appeared to apply 
strict scrutiny to determine that the BRA did not unjustifiably infringe upon 
the detainees’ substantive due process rights.43 However, because that area 
of the analysis was somewhat unclear, lower courts have disagreed on what 
level of scrutiny the Court applied in Salerno.44 Furthermore, though it ap-
plied both tests in its analysis, the Court did not specify whether, in a sub-
stantive due process challenge concerning pretrial detention, lower courts 
should apply the rights test, the Bell test, or both.45 Since Bell and Salerno, 
courts in at least three circuits have found that the right to be free from de-
tention absent a determination of guilt is a fundamental right.46 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. at 750–51 (majority opinion) (identifying the right involved as the fundamental right 
to liberty and appearing to apply strict scrutiny, in accordance with the rights test). 
 42 Id. Compare Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 631 (determining that Salerno did not recognize a 
fundamental right and thus involved rational basis review), with Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 
780–81 (determining that Salerno recognized a fundamental right and thus involved strict scruti-
ny). 
 43 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749–51 (identifying the government’s interest—community safe-
ty—as compelling and explaining that the BRA was narrowly focused on an acute problem). The 
Court concluded that the BRA was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest for the 
same three reasons it had found that the law was not excessive in relation to the government inter-
est. Id. at 750. These three reasons were: the BRA only applied to a limited class of individuals; 
Congress reasonably determined that these individuals were more likely to present a danger to the 
community if released; and the government had to satisfy a high evidentiary standard to secure the 
detainee’s continued detention. Id. The Court stated that where the government had proven an 
individual to be a danger to society, the government could constitutionally infringe upon the indi-
vidual’s fundamental right to liberty by requiring detention. Id. at 751. 
 44 Compare Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 631 (determining that Salerno did not recognize a 
fundamental right and thus involved rational basis review), with Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 
780–81 (determining that Salerno recognized a fundamental right and thus involved strict scrutiny 
review). Even Chief Judge Tymkovich, concurring in Dawson II, expressed his confusion with 
Salerno’s analysis. See 732 F. App’x at 637–38 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging 
that the Supreme Court was not as clear as it could have been in Salerno and expressing no sur-
prise that the Ninth Circuit interpreted the opinion differently). 
 45 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–51 (using the Bell test to scrutinize the BRA and appearing to 
use the rights test, but failing to specify whether both or either mode of analysis was sufficient in 
the inquiry). 
 46 Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 780–81 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750) (applying the prec-
edent of Salerno and finding that it is a fundamental right to be free from pretrial detention absent 
a determination of guilt); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (explain-
ing that Salerno found a fundamental liberty interest and that the state may not incarcerate a pre-
trial detainee absent flight risks or showing of danger to community); Welchen v. County of Sac-
ramento, No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLN-KJN, 2016 WL 5930563, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to policies imposing restrictions on pretrial detention); Barnes v. District of 
Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that individuals have a basic liberty 
interest in being free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction). 
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B. Dawson II’s Factual Background and Procedural History 
On Thursday, May 29, 2014, police arrested Kenneth Jerome Dawson 
at his home in Lakewood, Colorado for allegedly violating a restraining 
order prohibiting him from contacting his wife.47 The police brought Daw-
son to the Jefferson County Jail, where he was placed in the custody of the 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”).48 The next morning, 
Dawson’s bond was set at $1,500 and his release was authorized subject to 
two conditions: his posting of the bond and the jail’s staff or its vendor fit-
ting him with a GPS monitoring device.49 Later that same morning, Jeffer-
son County Pretrial Services Department (“Pretrial Services”) put a hold on 
Dawson’s release, requiring him to remain in custody until Pretrial Services 
notified the Sheriff’s Office otherwise.50 
Two written policies of the Jefferson County Division of Justice Ser-
vices authorized Dawson’s hold: (1) Policy No. 3.1.43, “Pretrial Holds and 
Releases” (“Holding Policy”); and (2) Policy No. 3.1.68, “Electronic Moni-
toring” (“Monitoring Policy”).51 In accordance with the Monitoring Policy, 
pretrial detainees who posted bond after 1 p.m. on Friday and before 1 p.m. 
on the following Monday would be outfitted with a GPS monitor on Mon-
day at 4 p.m.52 
Dawson posted bond sometime after 1 p.m. on Friday, May 30, 2014.53 
That night, a Sheriff’s Office employee notified Pretrial Services that Dawson 
had posted bond and was awaiting the fitment of a GPS monitoring device to 
effectuate his release.54 Pretrial Services did not complete the fitment that 
night.55 In fact, from the evening of Friday, May 30, until the afternoon of 
Monday, June 2—in accordance with the Holding and Monitoring Policies 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 625. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 625–26. 
 50 Id. at 625. 
 51 Id. at 626. Together, the Holding and Monitoring Policies authorized and required Pretrial 
Services staff to continue to detain a detainee until the detainee had been outfitted with a GPS 
monitoring device. Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty. (Dawson I), No. 16-cv-
01281-MEH, 2017 WL 5188341, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2017), aff’d, 732 F. App’x at 632. Once 
the detainee had been fitted with the monitoring device, the detainee could be released if he or she 
had posted bond. Id. 
 52 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 626. The Monitoring Policy also provided that defendants who 
posted bond before 1 p.m. on Monday through Friday were outfitted with a GPS monitoring de-
vice later that same day, while defendants who posted bond after 1 p.m. Monday through Thurs-
day were outfitted with the device the following day at 4 p.m. Id. In addition, the Monitoring Poli-
cy stated that all referral paperwork be provided to the jail’s vendor no later than 2 p.m. in order to 
enable the vendor to outfit the pretrial detainee with the monitoring device by 4 p.m. that same 
day. Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Dawson I, 2017 WL 5188341, at *2. 
 55 Id. 
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(collectively, “County Policies”)—no one from Pretrial Services or the Sher-
iff’s Office made any effort to fit Dawson with a GPS monitoring device or to 
otherwise facilitate his release.56 Ultimately, Dawson was not fit with the 
GPS monitoring device and released until Wednesday, June 4, 2014.57 
On May 27, 2016, Dawson brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that the defendants infringed upon his right to be free from 
detention absent a determination of guilt in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.58 The District Court found that Dawson 
had failed to state a plausible § 1983 municipal liability claim against the 
county entities and granted the County’s motion to dismiss.59 
On appeal, Dawson argued that he had plausibly stated a claim to relief 
because the right to be free from detention absent a determination of guilt is 
a fundamental right that could not be infringed by any county policy unless 
that policy was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.60 In 
the alternative, he argued that even if the court ruled that the right to be free 
from detention absent a criminal conviction is a non-fundamental right, the 
County Policies nonetheless violated substantive due process because they 
were not reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.61 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. Although the Monitoring Policy required plaintiff to be outfitted with a GPS monitoring 
device on Monday, June 2, 2014, at 4 p.m., neither Pretrial Services nor the Sheriff’s Office took 
any action to accomplish this task until Tuesday, June 3, 2014, when a Sheriff’s Office employee 
sent an email to all Pretrial Services employees reminding them that plaintiff had met his bond and 
was only waiting on the GPS fitment for release. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at *1, *3. The defendants included the Sherriff’s Office and Pretrial Services, as well as 
the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners, Jefferson County Department of Human 
Services, and Jefferson County Division of Justice Services. Id. at *1. A Section 1983 claim ena-
bles plaintiffs to hold state actors responsible for the harms they cause when, in their official ca-
pacity, they infringe upon the constitutional rights of a United States citizen. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012). Typically, defendants in Section 1983 actions are government employees who act under 
the color of state law because their jobs require them to exercise authority on behalf of the state. 
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, 1 STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1.3, 
Westlaw (database updated June 2018). 
 59 Dawson I, 2017 WL 5188341, at *13 (finding that the county’s policies did not violate Daw-
son’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonably protracted detention because they 
were reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and did not “shock the conscience”). In 
the Tenth Circuit, there are three requirements for a municipal liability claim under Section 1983: 
“(1) the existence of an official policy or custom; (2) a direct causal link between the policy and the 
constitutional injury; and (3) that the defendant established the policy with deliberate indifference to 
an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 628; see also Schneider v. 
City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767–69 (10th Cir. 2013). The Dawson II court 
held that Dawsom had properly pled the first two requirements, but not the third, since it did not view 
the county’s holding and monitoring policies as violating any substantive due process right. 732 
F. App’x at 628. 
 60 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, Dawson II, 732 F. App’x 624 (No. 17-1118). Dawson 
maintained that the County Policies would fail under a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 17. 
 61 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, Dawson II, supra note 3, at 19. Dawson argued that a policy 
requiring a pretrial detainee who posted bond after 1 p.m. on a Friday to wait three days to be 
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The Tenth Circuit held that the right to be free from pretrial detention 
absent a determination of guilt is not a fundamental right but is instead a 
non-fundamental liberty interest which, when implicated by a government 
policy, is properly analyzed under rational basis review.62 Under that analy-
sis, the Tenth Circuit determined that the County Policies were constitution-
al.63 The court denied Dawson’s petition for a rehearing en banc, and he 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari.64 The Supreme Court denied certiorari 
on January 7, 2019.65 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ANALYZING THE TWO DECISIONS 
In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit considered 
whether a controversial amendment—known as Proposition 100—to Arizo-
na’s Constitution violated individuals’ substantive due process rights.66 In 
ruling the law unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit held that the right to be free 
from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt is fundamental.67 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses the Ninth Circuit’s approach in that case, Lopez-
Valenzuela v. Arpaio, to analyzing a substantive due process claim within the 
context of pretrial detention.68 Section B discusses the United States Court of 
Appeals for Tenth Circuit’s differing approach in Dawson v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Jefferson County (“Dawson II”).69 
A. Lopez-Valenzuela’s Analysis: Rights Plus Bell Test 
In Lopez-Valenzuela, the Ninth Circuit considered a due process chal-
lenge to Proposition 100, an amendment to Arizona’s Constitution.70 Propo-
sition 100 mandated that state courts must deny bail, irrespective of whether 
                                                                                                                           
released is not reasonably related to the identified government interests of administrative conven-
ience and efficient coordination between governmental entities. Id. at 19–20. Dawson contended 
that the policies cut against those interests because they caused the County to incur additional 
expenses and added to the responsibilities of jail staff. Id. at 20–21. He suggested that the Coun-
ty’s true interest in maintaining the policy was preserving jail staff’s weekend leisure time—an 
interest that would not qualify as legitimate. Id. at 19–20. 
 62 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 632. The court then found that the county’s policies were ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government interest—administrative efficiency—and upheld the 
district court’s dismissal of the Dawson’s claim. Id. at 632–33. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dawson III, supra note 6, at 8, 23. 
 65 Dawson III, 139 U.S. at 863. 
 66 Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 67 See id. at 780–81 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)) (explaining 
that Salerno and its progeny recognize that freedom from pretrial detention absent a determination 
of guilt is a fundamental right). 
 68 See infra notes 70–81 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 70 Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 775. 
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the arrestee posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, if there was 
sufficient evidence that the arrestee entered or remained in the United States 
illegally and committed a serious offense.71 The plaintiffs argued that Prop-
osition 100 violated their substantive due process rights because, under Bell 
v. Wolfish, it impermissibly imposed punishment before a determination of 
guilt, and, under Washington v. Glucksberg, it was not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.72 The district court granted the defendants’ partial 
motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed.73 
The Ninth Circuit conducted a two-part substantive due process in-
quiry to determine whether the challenged provisions of Proposition 100 
violated the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.74 First, it deployed the 
rights test established by Glucksberg.75 The court reasoned that the right to 
be free from pretrial detention is fundamental in nature.76 Consequently, it 
applied strict scrutiny to the challenged provisions and found that although 
Arizona had a compelling state interest in ensuring detainees accused of 
serious crimes showed up for trial, the challenged provisions of Proposition 
100 were not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.77 
Second, the court applied the Bell test to determine whether the law 
amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.78 It first considered 
the legislative intent behind Proposition 100 and found that the record did not 
support a finding that Proposition 100 was motivated by an improper punitive 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. Under Proposition 100, an arrestee deemed ineligible for bail at the initial court appear-
ance could move for an evidentiary hearing. Id. At the follow-up hearing, known as a “Simp-
son/Segura” hearing, the arrestee could dispute whether there was probable cause that he or she 
entered or remained in the United States illegally, but, once that was found to be the case, could 
not refute Proposition 100’s presumption that he or she posed an unmanageable flight risk. Id. 
 72 Id. at 776. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 780. Based on its reading of Salerno, the court concluded that it would apply the Bell 
test in addition to the rights test. Id. at 778–80 In addition, the court looked to Schall v. Martin, 
where the Supreme Court applied both the Bell test and rights test to a state law authorizing pretri-
al detention of juveniles. Id. at 779 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). 
 75 See id. at 780–81 (discussing the rights test as the “familiar” substantive due process in-
quiry, requiring the court to determine if the right is fundamental, and, if it is, if the law infringing 
that right is narrowly-tailored to a compelling government interest). 
 76 See id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750) (explaining that Salerno and its progeny recognize 
the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt as fundamental in na-
ture); see also Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty. (Dawson II), 732 F. App’x 624, 
637–38 (10th Cir. 2018) (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (noting that the court in Lopez-Valenzuela 
found the right to be free from pretrial detention is fundamental), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 
(2019). 
 77 See Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 782–84. The court reached its conclusion that the chal-
lenged provisions of Proposition 100 were not narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest 
because the provisions (1) did not address a particularly acute problem, (2) were not limited to a 
specific category of extremely serious offenses, and (3) did not require an adversarial hearing at 
which the State was required to prove the arrestee posed an unmanageable risk of flight. Id. 
 78 Id. at 789–91. 
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purpose.79 It then considered whether the Proposition was excessive in rela-
tion to the state’s compelling interest and determined that it was excessive 
because it purported to deal with a problem that had not been shown to exist 
and employed an overly-broad, irrefutable presumption that deprived detain-
ees across the board of a fundamental right regardless of whether the they 
actually posed a risk of flight.80 The court concluded that Proposition 100 
failed both of the tests and invalidated the law as unconstitutional.81 
B. Dawson II’s Analysis: Rights Test Only 
The Dawson II court’s substantive due process analysis began with a 
discussion of Bell.82 Though the Dawson II court quoted directly from the 
section of the Bell opinion that explained the test for determining whether a 
government action amounts to impermissible punishment of a pretrial de-
tainee, it did not apply the test in its ruling, nor did it explain why.83 As a 
result, the court did not analyze whether the County Policies amounted to 
permissible regulation or impermissible punishment of a pretrial detainee—
which the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno and the Ninth Circuit 
in Lopez-Valenzuela did analyze.84 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. at 790. This was in part due to the fact that Proposition 100 had passed via referendum 
and it was difficult to assign intent to an electorate. Id. Despite its finding, however, the court 
observed that there was significant evidence of punitive intent in the record. See id. at 790 & n.14 
(“There is strong evidence that Proposition 100 was motivated at least in significant part by a 
desire to punish undocumented immigrants for (1) entering and remaining in the country without 
authorization and (2) allegedly committing the charged offense.”). 
 80 Id. at 791. 
 81 Id. at 792. The court implied that a law would be unconstitutional were it to fail either one 
of the tests. See id. at 791 (stating that Proposition 100 violated the substantive due process com-
ponent of Fourteenth Amendment on those “two independent grounds”). 
 82 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630. 
 83 See id. at 630–31 (emphasizing that the proper inquiry in a pretrial detention substantive 
due process claim is whether the policy at issue amounts to punishment of the detainee). The 
Dawson II court did not discuss whether the Board of County Commissioners adopted the holding 
and monitoring Policies for a punitive purpose or whether the policies were excessive in relation 
to the legitimate government interest used to justify them. Id. Although the majority in Dawson II 
did not articulate why it chose not apply Bell’s three-part test, Chief Judge Tymkovich, in concur-
rence, expressed his belief that the Lopez-Valenzuela two-part approach—applying the rights test 
and the Bell test—went outside of the overarching substantive due process framework the Su-
preme Court had announced in Glucksberg. Id. at 638 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring). 
 84 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747–48 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)) (refer-
ring to the framework of Bell and concluding that the BRA was not imposed for a punitive pur-
pose, but rather was imposed to satisfy a compelling government interest, and was not excessive 
in relation to that interest); Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 780 (explaining that it would use Bell’s 
framework to determine whether Proposition 100 imposed impermissible punishment before de-
termination of guilt); see also Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630–32 (stating that as long as the poli-
cies are not imposed for the purpose of punishment, and instead rationally relate to a legitimate 
government interest, they are constitutional). The court did not engage in any analysis to deter-
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While the Dawson II court did not apply Bell’s three-part analysis, it 
did deploy Gluckberg’s rights test.85 First, it identified the right at issue as a 
detainee’s right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of 
guilt when the detainee has fulfilled all of the conditions of release within 
his control.86 Next, it considered whether the right was fundamental in na-
ture and concluded, relying on its interpretation of Salerno, that the right 
was a non-fundamental right.87 In accordance with its interpretation of Sa-
lerno, it then proceeded to apply rational basis review to the County Poli-
cies and concluded that the County Policies were constitutional because 
they were rationally related to at least one legitimate government interest.88 
The court also pointed to two other Tenth Circuit cases on pretrial detention 
in support of its conclusion, however, neither of those cases had undertaken 
a fundamental rights inquiry.89 
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF PRE-TRIAL RELEASE,  
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY  
TO CLARIFY THE STATE OF THE LAW 
Section A of this Part argues that, although the Supreme Court has 
never explicitly stated as much, the most accurate reading of Court prece-
dent leads to the conclusion that the right to be free from detention absent a 
                                                                                                                           
mine whether the policies were imposed for a punitive purpose or were excessive in relation to the 
legitimate government interest. Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 632. 
 85 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 631. The Dawson II court concluded that the Salerno Court did not find a fundamen-
tal right at issue and had analyzed the challenged provisions of the BRA under rational basis re-
view. Id. The Dawson II court interpreted Salerno as refusing to categorically state that pretrial 
detention offends some principle of justice so rooted in history as to be ranked fundamental. Id. 
 88 Id. at 632–33. The court found that the county’s policies were rationally related to the 
County’s legitimate interest of obtaining “administrative convenience.” Id. 
 89 Id. at 631–32. In Gaylor v. Does, the plaintiff remained incarcerated for five days without a 
hearing and without information about his bail status, even though the judge had set the plaintiff’s 
bail the day after his arrest. 105 F.3d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1997). The defendants failed to provide a 
legitimate government interest in support of their policy of informing a detainee of his or her bond 
status only if he or she inquired about it. Id. at 577–78. Consequently, the court found that the 
policy constituted impermissible punishment. Id. In Dodds v. Richardson, the plaintiff challenged 
a county policy that prevented him from posting bail after work hours and before he had been 
arraigned before a judge. 614 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 2010). Similar to the holding in Gay-
lor, the Tenth Circuit held that the policy was unconstitutional because the county was not able to 
offer a legitimate government interest in support of the policy. Id. at 1193. The Dawson II court 
reasoned implicitly that since rational basis review had been applied in Gaylor and Dodds, it was 
also appropriately applied in the case at bar. Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 632. Importantly, howev-
er, the plaintiffs in those cases had not argued that the court should apply strict scrutiny in its re-
view of the policies, since the state had conceded it did not have a legitimate government interest 
in support of the policies. Appellant’s Reply Brief, Dawson II, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
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determination of guilt is fundamental in nature.90 Section B argues that the 
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to clarify the Dawson v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County (“Dawson II”) court’s 
use of rational basis review as a result of its interpretation of United States 
v. Salerno, and its failure to apply Bell v. Wolfish’s three-part analysis.91 
Such clarification appears necessary to prevent further confusion among 
lower courts in applying the law to pretrial detention cases.92 Finally, Sec-
tion C argues that the Court should have granted certiorari to modify the 
Bell test’s third part, and in doing so encourage a more objective analysis 
among lower courts.93 
A. The Right to Be Free from Pretrial Detention Absent  
a Determination of Guilt is a Fundamental Right 
In Salerno, the Court implicitly held that the right to be free from de-
tention absent a determination of guilt is fundamental in nature.94 The Court 
noted that in the United States, liberty is the default norm and pretrial deten-
tion is the exception—and an exception that should be carefully limited by 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 100–111 and accompanying text. 
 92 Compare Welchen v. County of Sacramento, 343 F. Supp. 3d 924, 938 (E.D. Cal. 2018) 
(finding, under the precedent of Lopez-Valenazuela, that a pretrial-detainee-plaintiff survived 
motion to dismiss because he had pled sufficient facts to suggest the policy was excessive in rela-
tion to the government interest), with Williams v. Cook County, No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLN-DB, 
2019 WL 952160, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2019) (citing Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jef-
ferson Cty. (Dawson II), 732 F. App’x 624, 630 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 
(2019)) (dismissing a pretrial-detainee-plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim with a quick cite 
to Dawson II by concluding their liberty interest was non-fundamental, and not engaging in a Bell 
test analysis on excessiveness in relation to the government interest). 
 93 See infra notes 112–120 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating that the most 
basic of liberty interests is being free from physical detention by the government and citing Saler-
no for the proposition that detention without trial is a carefully limited exception); Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (explaining that freedom from detention by the government lies 
at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and citing Salerno for the proposi-
tion that government detention violates the clause unless there are adequate procedural safe-
guards); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Salerno to 
explain that the detention of an individual by the government triggers heightened scrutiny and 
necessitates a sufficiently compelling government interest in order to survive substantive due 
process claim); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1992) (recognizing that freedom from 
bodily restraint has always been a central liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and reason-
ing implicitly that Salerno applied strict scrutiny to the BRA); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 750–51 (1987) (making clear that the right at issue was, at its core, the individual’s strong 
interest in liberty and emphasizing that the Court did not minimize the fundamental nature of the 
right); Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Salerno 
and the cases that followed it recognized that freedom from bodily restraint at the hands of the 
government has always been one of the most important rights protected by the Due Process 
Clause). 
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courts.95 The Court conceded the existence of a general rule of substantive 
due process that prohibits the government from detaining a person prior to a 
determination of guilt without a “sufficiently weighty” justification.96 The 
Court recognized that the BRA infringed a detainee’s strong liberty interest 
and noted that its reasoning was not minimizing the fundamental nature of 
that right.97 In its analysis, the Court employed the language of strict scruti-
ny: it described the government’s interest as “compelling” and “overwhelm-
ing,” and stated that the BRA was constitutional because it was narrowly 
focused and carefully delineated by Congress.98 The Court’s jurisprudence 
in a line of cases since Salerno has solidified the interpretation that the right 
to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt is funda-
mental in nature.99 
B. The Supreme Court Should Have Clarified the  
Dawson II Court’s Application of the Law 
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to clarify the Daw-
son II court’s application of the law in two areas: (1) the court’s use of ra-
tional basis review as a result of its interpretation of Salerno, and (2) its 
failure to apply Bell’s three-part analysis.100 As lower courts continue to 
take markedly different approaches to evaluating pretrial detainees’ substan-
tive due process claims, such clarification appears necessary to promote 
consistency and reduce confusion.101  
                                                                                                                           
 95 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
 96 Id. at 749, 750–51. 
 97 Id. at 750. 
 98 Id. at 750–51. 
 99 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (stating that the most basic of liberty interests is being free 
from physical detention by the government and citing Salerno for the proposition that detention 
without trial is a carefully limited exception); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (explaining that freedom 
from detention by the government lies at the heart of the liberty protected); Flores, 507 U.S. at 
316 (citing Salerno to explain that the detention of an individual by the government triggers 
heightened scrutiny and necessitates a sufficiently compelling government interest in order to 
survive substantive due process claim); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80–81 (recognizing that freedom 
from bodily restraint has always been a central liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and 
reasoning implicitly that Salerno applied strict scrutiny to the BRA); see also Oviatt ex rel. Waugh 
v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the essential liberty interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause is freedom from incarceration). 
 100 See infra notes 101–111 and accompanying text. 
101 See e.g., Williams, 2019 WL 952160, at *5; Welchen, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 938. In Williams, 
the plaintiffs had successfully posted their bonds. 2019 WL 952160, at *1. Nevertheless, the sher-
iff denied them entry into an electronic monitoring program and continued to detain them for 
periods ranging from three to twelve days. Id. The sheriff had denied their release pursuant to his 
new policy: independently reviewing state court decisions granting bond and refusing to comply 
with those decisions if he disagreed with them. Id. The plaintiffs brought a Section 1983 claim 
alleging the sheriff’s policy resulted in “unwarranted bodily restraint” and violated their substan-
tive due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at *4. In granting the sheriff’s 
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The Dawson II court noted that in Salerno the Supreme Court refused 
to categorically hold that pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt 
offends some principle of justice so deeply rooted in society as to be ranked 
fundamental.102 As a result, the Dawson II court concluded that the Su-
preme Court had explicitly declined to recognize the right as fundamental in 
all circumstances, and proceeded to apply rational basis review because the 
right at issue was non-fundamental.103 But that is not what Salerno held, 
rather, it held that the government may infringe a detainee’s fundamental 
right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination of guilt under 
circumstances where the government has proved the detainee to be a danger 
to society.104 In Dawson II, such a circumstance was not present; the Sher-
iff’s Office continued to detain Dawson after he had posted bond not be-
cause the County had proved he was a danger to society, but because satis-
fying his remaining term of release—fitting him with a GPS monitoring 
device—was not administratively efficient or convenient.105 A fuller and 
more comprehensive reading of Salerno suggests that the Dawson II court 
                                                                                                                           
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, the court gave a quick cite to Daw-
son II, stating that the right at issue was a “non-fundamental right” that did not meet the “rigorous 
substantive due process standard.” Id. at *5 (citing Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630). The court did 
not mention Bell or its analysis. Id. In Welchen, an indigent and homeless man was arrested and 
then detained for six days before he was eventually discharged. 343 F. Supp. 3d at 928. He was 
detained for the extended period pursuant to California Penal Code Section 1269(b), which re-
quired he pay $10,000 in bail to secure his release. Id. Subsequent to his discharge from prison, he 
brought a Section 1983 claim against the county and the sheriff, alleging that they had violated his 
substantive due process rights by enforcing the state’s bail law. Id. at 929. He further argued that 
the state’s bail law was facially unconstitutional because it was not narrowly-tailored to a compel-
ling interest and was excessive in relation to its purpose. Id. at 928–29. In denying the county’s 
motion to dismiss, the district court analyzed the law under Bell and Lopez-Valenzuela and con-
cluded that the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to show the bail law had a punitive purpose or 
was excessive in relation to its purpose. Id. at 937–38 (citing Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 791–
92). The court did not undergo a rights test analysis even though the plaintiff had alleged the coun-
ty violated his fundamental right to pretrial liberty. Id.; Complaint at 13, Welchen, 343 F. Supp. 3d 
924 (No. 2:16-cv-00185). 
 102 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 631. 
 103 See id. (reasoning implicitly that because Salerno did not categorically hold that govern-
ment’s infringement upon the right to be free from detention absent a determination of guilt al-
ways categorically violated substantive due process, it must not have recognized a fundamental 
right). 
 104 See Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 780 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750) (finding that 
Salerno recognized a fundamental right and had approved of the BRA’s infringement on the right 
only because it found the BRA to be narrowly-tailored to a compelling government interest); see 
also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (holding that under circumstances where the government has 
proved a detainee to be a danger to society, it has a compelling interest—public safety—to support 
its infringement upon the detainee’s fundamental right). So long as the law furthering the compel-
ling interest is narrowly tailored, it will pass constitutional muster even though it implicates a 
fundamental right. Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 780. 
 105 See Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty. (Dawson I), No. 16-cv-01281-
MEH, 2017 WL 5188341, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2017), aff’d, 732 F. App’x at 632. 
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should have applied strict scrutiny—or at least a more heightened level of 
scrutiny than it did.106 
Next, the Dawson II court did not engage in the three-part analysis 
seemingly required by Bell to determine whether the detention policy con-
stituted impermissible punishment.107 The court did not evaluate whether 
the County Policies were adopted by the Board of County Commissioners 
for a punitive purpose, or whether the policies were excessive in relation to 
the legitimate government interest—administrative efficiency—justifying 
them.108 If the court had undertaken such an analysis, it might have consid-
ered any number of facts or statistics that could have led it to conclude the 
County Policies were excessive in relation to the legitimate government 
interest and thus amounted to unconstitutional punishment before a deter-
mination of guilt.109 Instead, it accepted the County’s stated interest as a 
given, which effectively ended the inquiry.110 In sum, given the split be-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749–51 (applying heightened scrutiny to the BRA because the 
right at issue was fundamental); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to 
Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1349 (2014) (suggesting the use of intermediate scrutiny to 
evaluate pretrial detention policies). If the Dawson II court had applied strict scrutiny, it would 
have had to consider whether administrative efficiency was a compelling government interest, 
and, if it was, whether the policies were narrowly tailored to effectuating that compelling interest. 
Spece Jr., supra note 21, at 295–96. 
 107 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747–48 (utilizing the Bell test to determine that the BRA was not 
imposed for a punitive purpose, but rather was imposed to satisfy a compelling government inter-
est, and was not excessive in relation to that interest); Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630–31 (not 
engaging in an analysis of whether the Board of County Commissioners had adopted the holding 
and monitoring policies for a punitive purpose or whether the policies were excessive in relation 
to the legitimate government interest used to justify them). 
 108 Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 630–31. In a concurring opinion, Tenth Circuit Chief Judge 
Tymkovich briefly argued that applying the Bell test in addition to the rights test announced in 
Glucksberg—as the court did in Lopez-Valenzuela—would create an additional and unnecessary 
due process framework. Id. at 638 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring). 
 109 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, Dawson II, supra note 3, at 20–21. Plaintiff listed several 
reasons why the County Policies could be found excessive in relation to the County’s interest. Id. 
First, when GPS monitoring is ordered for a detainee, the fitment process must be completed at 
some point and postponing it by three days does not make the process any more or less time-
consuming. Id. Second, by detaining the detainee for three extra days, the County incurs additional 
expenses associated with caring for the detainee. Id. Third, by extending the detention period, the 
County increases its exposure to liability as well as the risk of injury to the detainee. Id. Conse-
quently, Plaintiff argued that the court erred in its application of motion to dismiss pleading stand-
ards by basing its decision on whether the moving party had asserted a plausible government in-
terest rather than on whether the non-moving party had stated a plausible claim for relief. Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Dawson III, supra note 6, at 21. Plaintiff argued that such an approach 
would encourage government actors in similar lawsuits to argue that any policy would increase 
administrative efficiency, knowing that such an argument could secure dismissal of the claim 
without affording the plaintiff any opportunity to test his or her assertion through discovery. Id. 
 110 See Dawson II, 732 F. App’x at 633 (finding that since it is more convenient for the jail to 
refrain from conducting the GPS monitoring device fitment process over the weekend, the policies 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, regardless of how little time the fitment 
process would take or how much administrative efficiency the county has actually obtained). 
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tween the Tenth and Ninth Circuit on these two points of law and the confu-
sion it has continued to engender in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
should have granted certiorari to clarify: (1) whether Salerno recognized a 
fundamental right, and (2) whether courts must use the rights test or the Bell 
test—or both tests—when considering a substantive due process challenge 
to a government pretrial detention policy.111 
C. A More Objective Analysis: Recommendations  
for Modifying the Bell Test 
In a criminal justice system where the use of GPS monitoring of pre-
trial detainees has increased and where courts have discerned an uptick in 
over-detention cases, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to 
modify the Bell test’s third part in an effort to encourage lower courts to 
engage in a more objective analysis of whether the policy at issue is exces-
sive in relation to the government interest.112 As Justice Marshall pointed 
out in his dissent in Bell, the test as formulated does not supply lower courts 
with sufficiently objective criteria with which to undertake a reasoned anal-
ysis of whether the policy is excessive in relation to the legitimate govern-
ment interest.113 In cases like Dawson II, a county’s motivation behind en-
                                                                                                                           
 111 Compare id. at 630–31 (reasoning that Salerno did not recognize a fundamental right, and 
not engaging in the Bell analysis of whether the policy was excessive in relation to the legitimate 
government interest at issue), with Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 780–81 (reasoning that Salerno 
did recognize a fundamental right, and engaging in the Bell analysis of whether the policy is ex-
cessive in relation to the legitimate government interest). 
 112 See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (commenting that the type 
of claim brought by the plaintiff has become so common it has acquired its own term of art: “over-
detention”); Use of Electronic Offender-Tracking Devices Expands Sharply, PEW CHARITABLE 
TR. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-
of-electronic-offender-tracking-devices-expands-sharply [https://perma.cc/L9TK-CLDF]. Accord-
ing to a 2015 study, the number of accused and convicted criminal offenders in the United States 
who are monitored with ankle bracelets and other electronic tracking devices rose nearly 140 per-
cent over ten years—from 53,000 in 2005 to 125,000 in 2015. Id. Courts have held that when only 
administrative tasks remain to process a detainee’s release, delays of as little as thirty minutes can 
violate substantive due process. See Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
a twenty-six to twenty-nine hour delay in release precluded summary judgment for the govern-
ment on a Section 1983 claim); Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 735–736 (8th Cir. 
2001) (holding that holding a person for thirty-minutes after his release was ordered could violate 
a detainee’s due process rights); O’Donnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 733 (S.D. Tex. 
2016), aff’d, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff had stated a claim in his due 
process challenge to post-arrest detention policies that resulted in an under-24-hour over-
detention); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 278 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that 
an over-detention policy preventing release after 10 p.m. of a pretrial detainee who had been or-
dered released violated substantive due process); Holder v. Town of Newton, 638 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
155–56 (D.N.H. 2009) (denying a town’s motion to dismiss where detainee was held for nine 
hours as required by government policy after being granted release). 
 113 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 564–65 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the Bell Court took a standard that was sensitive to the deprivations imposed on detainees and 
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acting the policy will frequently not be a matter of public record.114 As a 
result, it may be difficult for a court to objectively discern the first part of 
the Bell test—whether the legislative body enacting the policy did so with 
punitive intent.115 In such cases, the excessiveness inquiry under Bell’s third 
part is determinative.116 As such, the Court should have taken this oppor-
tunity to provide guidance to lower courts on how to engage in the third part 
of the Bell analysis.117 A better standard might require courts, as part of the 
excessiveness inquiry, to evaluate certain objective criteria that would shift 
the analysis’s focus to the nature and effect of the policy’s infringement on 
the right at issue.118 Such criteria could include the potential length of the 
pretrial detainment contemplated by the policy; availability of less exces-
sive alternatives; practices in other similarly-situated detention facilities; 
and the recommendation of the Department of Justice and other profession-
al organizations.119 Without such additions, the door is open for state and 
                                                                                                                           
turned it into a standard that almost always gives a pass to jail administrators). In their respective 
dissents, Justices Marshall and Stevens each contended that the Court should have adhered to the 
factors laid out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, which they saw as more objective and instruc-
tive to the analysis of whether a given policy imposed impermissible punishment before determi-
nation of guilt. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168 (1963); id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168). 
 114 Id. at 565–66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. (observing that detainees challenging pretrial detention policies will bear a nearly in-
surmountable burden of proving punitive intent based on circumstantial evidence). 
 116 See Scarberry, supra note 29, at 1106 (stating that, due to difficulty of determining puni-
tive intent, the Bell inquiry will nearly always turn on excessiveness prong); see e.g., Lopez-
Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 790–91 (invalidating Proposition 100 on excessiveness grounds rather 
than punitive intent because punitive intent was difficult, if not impossible, to discern); Littlefield 
v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that court was unable to find punitive intent 
on part of county officials but finding a fifty-six-day detention of pretrial detainee was excessive 
and violated substantive due process). 
 117 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 564–67 (implying that the Bell test as formulated by the majority is 
not capable of objectively evaluating the excessiveness of the policy); Himsell, supra note 32, at 
464 (arguing that considering the length of the pretrial detention at issue as a factor in the Bell 
analysis would allow courts to better assess whether the policy is excessive in relation to the legit-
imate government interest); Wiseman, supra note 106, at 1349 (stating that since the Supreme 
Court has never explained whether the Bell analysis requires considering reasonable alternatives, 
the excessiveness inquiry is unclear). 
 118 Bell, 441 U.S. at 564–65. Justice Marshall noted that the Due Process Clause focuses on 
the effect of the deprivation of a right, rather than on the intent of the persons inflicting the depri-
vation. Id. at 567. As a result, he concluded that the effect of the detention policy should occupy a 
far greater place in the analysis than it does in the majority’s proposed test. Id. Justice Stevens also 
emphasized the need for courts to evaluate the effect of the detention. Id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see also Jean Koh Peters, Schall v. Martin and the Transformation of Judicial Precedent, 
31 B.C. L. REV. 641, 662 (1990) (stating that Bell and its progeny cases distorted the criteria laid 
out in Mendoza-Martinez—a distortion that led the excessiveness inquiry to focus on the policy 
and its conditions at the expense of its effect on the detainee). 
 119 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing potential criteria under 
which to evaluate the excessiveness prong); Himsell, supra note 32, at 464 (suggesting that the 
length of pretrial detention should be considered). 
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local governments to use a broadly stated interest in administrative efficiency 
to justify a detention policy without having to show that the efficiency ob-
tained by the policy actually warrants the requisite infringement on liberty.120 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Dawson II—that the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a deter-
mination of guilt is not a fundamental right, but rather a non-fundamental 
liberty interest—puts it at odds with the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. Previously, in Lopez-Valenzuela, the Ninth Circuit had 
held that the right to be free from pretrial detention absent a determination 
of guilt is a fundamental right. Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
does not provide an immediately apparent answer to the question of which 
court came to the correct conclusion, the most accurate reading of the 
Court’s jurisprudence indicates that the right to be free from detention ab-
sent a determination of guilt is fundamental in nature. Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court should have granted certiorari to clarify the Dawson II court’s 
application of the law and to modify the Bell test’s third part. Such clarifica-
tions would have provided courts with needed guidance on how to evaluate 
a pretrial detention substantive due process claim. To be sure, the implica-
tions of the Tenth Circuit’s decision will remain significant, as its holding 
promotes a standard that affords wide-ranging deference to the policies of 
detention facilities around the nation and makes it easier for courts to pass 
on their responsibility to apply the pro per level of scrutiny to the policy. 
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 120 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 567 (cautioning that almost any restriction on pretrial detainees can 
be found to have some rational relation to an interest like administrative efficiency); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Dawson III, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing that the approach taken by the Dawson 
II court would encourage governments in similar lawsuits to argue that any policy increases ad-
ministrative efficiency, knowing that such an argument could secure dismissal of the claim with-
out requiring the government to demonstrate the actual level of administrative efficiency obtained 
through the policy and without affording the plaintiff any opportunity to test its assertion through 
discovery). 
